USA v. Ruben Mitchell by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-24-2015 
USA v. Ruben Mitchell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Ruben Mitchell" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 907. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/907 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1574 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RUBEN MITCHELL, 
                            Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-09-cr-00105-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Submitted on June 1, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 24, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Ruben Mitchell appeals his final judgment of conviction and sentence, arguing 
that the District Court made numerous errors before and after his trial and when it 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment. Because we find no errors in the District 
Court’s rulings, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis.  
Mitchell was indicted in 2009 and charged with one count of knowingly, 
intentionally, and unlawfully attempting to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms 
or more of cocaine. A superseding indictment in 2010 added a conspiracy charge against 
Mitchell and 21 codefendants, and a second superseding indictment in 2012, among other 
things, added a codefendant and additional charges against others but not against 
Mitchell.  
The Government contended that Mitchell attempted to transport 19 kilograms of 
cocaine on a February 2008 Southwest Airlines flight from Oakland, California to 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During a layover in Las Vegas, Mitchell’s suitcase containing 
the drugs was mistakenly taken off the plane. Not knowing the suitcase’s owner and in an 
effort to identify him or her, Southwest employees opened the suitcase, observed the 
drugs, and notified law enforcement officials, who took possession of the suitcase and 
drugs. Before trial, Mitchell moved to suppress the drug evidence, but the District Court 
denied the motion.  
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Also before trial, in June 2013, the Government filed an information charging 
Mitchell with a prior conviction under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 851, making him 
eligible for an increased mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The 
District Court agreed with the Government, deciding, over Mitchell’s objection, that his 
prior conviction made him subject to the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence.  
Mitchell’s trial began in September 2013, and on October 30, 2013, Mitchell was 
convicted of both the attempted possession and conspiracy counts. At Mitchell’s 
sentencing, the District Court found that Mitchell had a criminal history category of I and 
a total offense level of 34, yielding an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 
188 months’ imprisonment. But because of his prior conviction, Mitchell faced a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 240 months for both counts. The District 
Court sentenced Mitchell to concurrent terms of 240 months’ imprisonment.   
Mitchell timely appealed.  
II.1 
Mitchell raises four issues on appeal. First, he disputes the District Court’s 
decision to impose a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. Second, he argues that the 
District Court should have suppressed the drug evidence recovered from the suitcase 
from the 2008 Southwest flight. Third, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the jury’s guilty verdict. And fourth, he contends that the District Court should 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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have dismissed the indictment because his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy 
trial were violated. We address these issues in turn.  
A. 
Mitchell first challenges the District Court’s decision to impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 
851. Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part, that for convictions involving 5 or 
more kilograms of cocaine under § 841, the punishment cannot be less than 20 years’ 
imprisonment if the person has a “prior conviction for a felony drug offense [that] has 
become final.” According to Mitchell, his prior offense is not a “prior conviction” within 
the meaning of § 841. Because Mitchell’s argument raises a purely legal question, we 
exercise plenary review.2  
The predicate offense here, which occurred in 1993, was possession of cocaine in 
violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11530(a). Mitchell pled no contest. He 
was placed on felony probation for 3 years and the imposition of sentence was 
suspended. Upon successfully completing his probation, Mitchell’s conviction was set 
aside pursuant to California law.3  
The meaning of the term “prior conviction” under § 841 is a matter of federal 
law.4 In United States v. Meraz, we held that offenses that resulted in deferred sentences 
                                              
2 United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). 
3 Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4.  
4 See Meraz, 998 F.2d at 183. 
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and probation under state diversionary sentencing programs qualified as final prior 
convictions under § 841.5 Although Meraz focused on the meaning of the term “final,” 
implicit in our holding was that a defendant whose sentence is subject to expungement 
after serving probation also has a “prior conviction” for the purposes of § 841. 
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court and hold that Mitchell’s 1993 drug offense 
is a prior conviction under § 841 based on his no contest plea, even though his sentence 
was suspended, he only served probation, and the offense was later set aside.6  
B. 
Next, Mitchell contends that the District Court incorrectly denied his motion to 
suppress the drug evidence from the suitcase. We apply a “mixed standard of review” to a 
district court’s order denying a motion to suppress, reviewing factual findings for clear 
error and legal conclusions de novo.7   
                                              
5 Id. at 184–85.  
6 Our holding is consistent with the nearly unanimous view of our sister circuits. 
See United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (collecting 
cases). We are unpersuaded by the reasoning of the one outlier case relied on by Mitchell, 
United States v. Stallings, 301 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002). Although Mitchell points out that 
California has since passed a law allowing people convicted of certain felonies, including 
possession of cocaine, to apply to have their felony convictions changed to misdemeanor 
convictions, that does not change the fact that Mitchell had a felony conviction at the 
time he violated § 841. See United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F.3d 414, 426–27 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“[A]t the time [the defendant] took the actions that would form the basis of his 
federal conviction, the sentencing court had not declared [his] earlier state conviction to 
be a misdemeanor.”). Nor is there any indication that Mitchell has actually applied to 
change his conviction to a misdemeanor or that his application would be granted if he did 
apply. 
7 United States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2012).  
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According to Mitchell, the District Court clearly erred when it found that 
Southwest employees opened the suitcase before law enforcement personnel opened it, 
and when the District Court found that Southwest employees were not acting as agents of 
law enforcement when they opened the suitcase. We disagree.  
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure “by a private 
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or 
knowledge of any governmental official.”8 Moreover, when a private actor initiates a 
search, law enforcement officers may constitutionally conduct a search that does not 
exceed the scope of the initial private search.9  
The District Court did not clearly err when it found that Southwest employees, not 
law enforcement, first searched the suitcase. The record amply supports this finding. Two 
Southwest employees, Jennifer O’Connor and Melissa Vallet, testified that they looked in 
the suitcase before any law enforcement officers did. Nor did the District Court err by 
finding that the Southwest employees were not acting as agents of law enforcement or at 
the direction of law enforcement. O’Connor testified that she opened the suitcase not for 
any law enforcement purpose, but “to look for the owner of the bag.”10 Moreover, Vallet 
testified that she observed what she believed to be cocaine in the suitcase, which she 
reported to law enforcement, so any subsequent search by law enforcement did not 
                                              
8 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
9 Id. at 115.  
10 S.A. 45.  
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exceed the scope of the initial private search. We therefore see no violation of Mitchell’s 
Fourth Amendment rights and, consequently, no error in the District Court’s denial of 
Mitchell’s suppression motion.  
C. 
 Mitchell argues further that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
convictions. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and 
will sustain the verdict “if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”11  
 We have little trouble upholding the jury’s verdict. With respect to the attempted 
possession count, a rational juror could have concluded that the suitcase containing the 
drugs belonged to Mitchell and that he intended to distribute the cocaine inside. The jury 
was presented with evidence showing that Mitchell had a suitcase that was too heavy to 
place in the plane’s overhead compartment, that the suitcase was checked, that Mitchell 
was unable to locate his suitcase when he arrived in Pittsburgh, and that Mitchell 
presented a baggage tag with the same number as the tag attached to the unclaimed 
suitcase containing cocaine in Las Vegas.  
 And with respect to the conspiracy count, the jury could have reasonably inferred 
that Mitchell was part of a drug conspiracy based on his numerous trips to Pittsburgh of 
short duration, his unexplained income, and the testimony of two coconspirators who 
                                              
11 United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 342 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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spoke of Mitchell’s involvement in the conspiracy as a courier,12 not to mention the 
evidence showing that Mitchell’s suitcase on his final trip contained 19 kilograms of 
cocaine. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
convictions.  
 Mitchell also moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for a new 
trial, and the District Court denied the motion. We review a district court’s denial of a 
motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.13 We find no abuse of discretion in the 
District Court’s decision to deny Mitchell’s motion, given the strong evidence of guilt.   
D. 
 Finally, Mitchell argues that the District Court should have dismissed the 
indictment based on violations of his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. 
Our review of the District Court’s legal conclusion that Mitchell’s speedy trial rights 
were not violated is plenary, and we review the factual underpinnings of that conclusion 
for clear error.14  
 Again, we disagree with Mitchell. Although there was a substantial delay between 
Mitchell’s 2009 arrest and his 2013 trial, we agree with the District Court that most of the 
delay is attributable to Mitchell’s and his codefendants’ pretrial litigation activities, 
                                              
12 Perez, 280 F.3d at 344 (“[U]ncorroborated accomplice testimony may 
constitutionally provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction. This is particularly 
the case where the defense has ample opportunity to cross-examine the Government’s 
witnesses . . . .” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
13 United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 390 (3d Cir. 2010).  
14 United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 2014).  
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ranging from changing lawyers to seeking extensions of time to filing numerous pretrial 
motions. We also agree with the District Court’s determination that the Government did 
not delay the case in bad faith or negligently, a determination to which we give 
“considerable deference.”15 Rather, the Government showed reasonable diligence in 
bringing this complex case to trial, and any prejudice Mitchell suffered because of the 
delay was largely attributable to his actions and his codefendants’ actions, not to the 
Government’s.  
 We are also unpersuaded by Mitchell’s argument that his statutory rights to a 
speedy trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3161 were violated. Here, Mitchell attacks the 
Government’s decision to twice bring superseding indictments as unreasonable actions to 
delay the case. But as the Government points out, the first superseding indictment added 
most of the coconspirators to the case, and the second superseding indictment added a 
significant player in the conspiracy to the case. These actions were hardly unreasonable.  
III. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s rulings. 
                                              
15 Id. at 176. 
